Archives par mot-clé : Birmanie/Myanmar

The Tale of Prince Vessantara at the Ashmolean Museum (Oxford)

« The Tale of Prince Vessantara », until 09 September 2018, Ashmolean Museum (University of Oxford)

The Buddha is believed to have had many lives before being born as Siddhartha Gautama. Stories of his past lives are known as jatakas (‘birth stories’). They play an important role in teaching Buddhist values.

The Vessantara Jataka is the last and most popular of the jataka tales. Here the Buddha was born as Prince Vessantara of the Sivi Kingdom, a very generous man who gave away everything, including his wife and children, to help others. His actions demonstrate the virtue of generosity, which in Buddhism is one of the ‘perfections’ required to achieve enlightenment.

The tale is often illustrated in Southeast Asian and Sri Lankan art. Buddhists can gain merit by making and commissioning these images. This display, drawn from the Ashmolean’s own collection, highlights a selection of Burmese and Sri Lankan drawings, paintings and woodcarvings of the story dating to the 19th century.

Curator : Dr Farouk Yahya

Voir : https://www.ashmolean.org/event/the-tale-of-prince-vessantara

 

Religion and society, vol. 8, n° 1 (sept. 2017)

Religion and society : advances in research, vol. 8, n° 1 (sept. 2017)

Special section : Towards a comparative anthropology of buddhism

  • Introduction : Legacies, Trajectories, and Comparison in the Anthropology of Buddhism by Nicolas Sihlé and Patrice Ladwig
  • Ritual Tattooing and the Creation of New Buddhist Identities : An Inquiry into the Initiation Process in a Burmese Organization of Exorcists by Bénédicte Brac de la Perrière
  • The Ethics of Collective Sponsorship : Virtuous Action and Obligation in Contemporary Tibet by Jane Caple
  • Belonging in a New Myanmar : The Cosmopolitics of an Apparently Non-religious Practice by Juliane Schober
  • The White Cotton Robe : Charisma and Clothes in Tibetan Buddhism Today by Magdalena Maria Turek
  • Rethinking Anthropological Models of Spirit Possession and Theravada Buddhism by Erick White
  • Afterword : So What Is the Anthropology of Buddhism About? by David N. Gellner

Voir : https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/religion-and-society/8/1/religion-and-society.8.issue-1.xml

 

 

 

 

Genealogies of Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in Burma

Genealogies of Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in Burma with Alicia Turner, Southeast Asia Crossroads Podcast

A écouter sur : https://soundcloud.com/seacrossroads/genealogies-of-religious-tolerance-and-intolerance-in-burma-with-alicia-turner-1?

Vous trouverez la liste des podcasts de Southeast Asia Crossroads ici : https://soundcloud.com/seacrossroads

Derniers podcasts :

  • Facebook, Leapfrogging, and the Dark Side in Myanmar with Lisa Brooten
  • Transnationalizing Cambodian Buddhism with John Marston
  • Archaeology and the Underpinnings of Ancient Vietnam with Nam Kim

 

For Myanmar’s Army, Ethnic Bloodletting Is Key to Power and Riches

« For Myanmar’s Army, Ethnic Bloodletting Is Key to Power and Riches » by Richard C. Paddock, 27/01/2018, The New York Times

For Myanmar’s army, the campaign of atrocity it has waged to drive hundreds of thousands of ethnic Rohingya Muslims out of the country is no innovation. The force was born in blood 76 years ago and has been shedding it ever since.

Its founders, known as the Thirty Comrades, established the army in 1941 with a ghoulish ceremony in Bangkok, where they drew each other’s blood with a single syringe, mixed it in a silver bowl and drank it to seal their vow of loyalty.

The army that they formed led the nation to independence in 1948. But except for a brief, initial period of peace, it has spent the last seven decades warring with its own people.

The army, known as the Tatmadaw, seized power from the civilian government in Burma, as the country is also known, in 1962. The military killed thousands of protesters to keep power in 1988 and suppressed another popular uprising, the Saffron Revolution, in 2007.

In constant fighting with ethnic minorities, the Tatmadaw has displaced millions of people while taking billions of dollars in profit from jade mines, teak forests and other natural resources. Its strategy has been to fight ethnic rebels to a standstill, manage the conflicts through cease-fires and enrich its officers.

“There has never been any sense of needing to win hearts and minds,” said Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington. “The Tatmadaw’s doctrine is based on total submission by the population through fear. And to that end, there is little they will not do.”

Though it holds itself up as the protector of Myanmar’s people, the military has a long history of murdering civilians, torturing and executing prisoners, committing rape, conscripting child soldiers, impressing convicts as porters and making civilians walk ahead of its troops to trip land mines.

Lire la suite sur : https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/world/asia/myanmar-military-ethnic-cleansing.html?

Religious extremism poses threat to ASEAN’s growth

« Religious extremism poses threat to ASEAN’s growth » by Gwen Robinson and Simon Roughneen, 14/12/2017, Nikkei Asian Review

Aided by social media, hardliners gain mainstream support

The Dec. 2 event marked a year since an estimated half-million people clamored in the rain for the arrest of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, the then-governor of Jakarta. Since then, Purnama, a Protestant of Chinese descent nicknamed Ahok, lost the gubernatorial election and was sentenced to two years in jail on the same blasphemy charges that brought massive crowds onto Jakarta’s streets late last year.

The episode raised concerns around the world that Indonesia’s relatively tolerant variant of Islam — and its secular democracy — was under attack. And it was a startling display of the strength of Islamist groups in Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population. Among the organizers were the Islamic Defenders Front, known as FPI, and the Islamic Ummah Forum.

Those groups do not claim affiliation with the al-Qaida-linked militants who killed 202 people in Bali in 2002, nor the estimated 1,150 Indonesians who traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight for the so-called Islamic State. But the government has been sufficiently alarmed to ban the local wing of Hizbut Tahrir, another Islamist movement involved in the anti-Ahok protests — and which hopes to establish a caliphate.

Across Asia, the rise of hard-line religious movements is fueling a macho form of nationalism and creating dangerous new fault lines in communities. Beyond Indonesia with its numerous Islamist groups are Myanmar’s zealous Buddhist organizations, which have stoked anti-Muslim sentiment to deadly effect. Bangladesh has seen the rise of Islamic fundamentalists including Hefazat-e-Islam, while Sri Lanka has Bodu Bala Sena, a radical Sinhalese Buddhist group.

Such groups number in the dozens across Asia — fundamentalist Buddhists, Muslims and Hindus who are adding new fuel on what are sometimes ancient ethnic conflicts. Some boast memberships that run into the hundreds of thousands, powered by zealous social media campaigns, community support programs and effective fundraising operations. The donations, often tiny amounts collected from poor followers, become a source of support for hard-line leaders.

Analysts warn that such ethno-religious chauvinism represents the biggest threat to the economic growth the region has enjoyed in recent years — and to the dream of greater cohesion over trade and economic issues. « Rapid economic growth over the past three decades has raised standards of living across much of Asia, but left marginal areas, like Mindanao in the Philippines and Rakhine State in Myanmar, untouched and therefore comparatively worse off, » said Michael Vatikiotis, Asia director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. « It is perhaps no coincidence that these areas are afflicted by violent conflict. »

Lire la suite sur : https://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20171214/On-the-Cover/Religious-extremism-poses-threat-to-ASEAN-s-growth

 

Religion and Violence in Myanmar: Sitagu Sayadaw’s Case for Mass Killing

Religion and Violence in Myanmar: Sitagu Sayadaw’s Case for Mass Killing by Matthew J. Walton, 06/11/2017, Foreign Affairs

The most common explanation given for the persecution of the Rohingya revolves around their nationality. Government officials, media commentators, and religious leaders have claimed that the Rohingya are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Ethnicity plays a role, as well. The government officially recognizes 135 indigenous ethnic groups, and Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution grants those groups certain rights. The Rohingya are not among them. More broadly, people in Myanmar insist that the Rohingya are not a real ethnic group because they worry about the unlikely possibility that the Rohingya will seek to secede, threatening the country’s territorial sovereignty.

Sitagu’s words could provide the final cover for Myanmar’s Buddhists to ignore international criticism and cloak themselves in the righteousness of holy war.

National identity in Myanmar has long been intertwined with Buddhist religious identity. But religion has had a particular effect in the case of the Rohingya. The so-called War on Terror—waged primarily against Muslims around the world—has made it easier for Myanmar’s elites to label the Rohingya as terrorists and for government officials to defend the violence against them as a legitimate response to extremism. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s attacks on government targets in October 2016 and August 2017, meanwhile, have validated many citizens’ belief that Islam is inherently violent and poses an existential threat to Buddhism, Myanmar’s majority religion. It has also allowed political and religious elites to unfairly and inaccurately associate all Rohingya with terrorism. Thanks to anti-Muslim ideas spread through social media sites, the popular press, and the writings and sermons of influential laypeople and monks, Myanmar’s citizens have come to see the Rohingya as doubly unwanted—as both national and religious “others.”

Lire la suite sur : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/burma-myanmar/2017-11-06/religion-and-violence-myanmar

Bagan and the World: Early Myanmar and Its Global Connections

Goh Geok Yian, John N. Miksic, Michael Aung-Thwin (eds), Bagan and the World: Early Myanmar and Its Global Connections, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017

The archaeological site of Bagan and the kingdom which bore its name contains one of the greatest concentrations of ancient architecture and art in Asia. Much of what is visible today consists of ruins of Buddhist monasteries. While these monuments are a major tourist attraction, recent advances in archaeology and textual history have added considerable new understanding of this kingdom, which flourished between the 11th and 14th centuries. Bagan was not an isolated monastic site; its inhabitants participated actively in networks of Buddhist religious activity and commerce, abetted by the sites location near the junction where South Asia, China and Southeast Asia meet.

This volume presents the result of recent research by scholars from around the world, including indigenous Myanmar people, whose work deserves to be known among the international community. The perspective on Myanmar’s role as an integral part of the intellectual, artistic and economic framework found in this volume yields a glimpse of new themes which future studies of Asian history will no doubt explore.

Voir la table des matières sur : https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/2278

Voices of Transition : Contemporary Art from Myanmar

Exhibition : Voices of Transition : Contemporary Art from Myanmar, 16/11/2017 – 03/12/2017, Lunn + Sgarbossa Gallery, Londres

Lunn+Sgarbossa presents ‘Voices of Transition: Contemporary Art from Myanmar’, an exhibition of unprecedented size, scale and scholarly ambition in Europe to display contemporary artists from Myanmar.

In our curation, we aim to communicate the dynamic experiences of artists in Myanmar from the inception of contemporary art in Myanmar in the 1980’s to the present day. Our title – ‘Voices of Transition’ – demonstrates our enquiry into the transitional context for contemporary artists, understanding the oppression of state censorship, and how artists have boldly fought to have their voices heard. We also place the work in a broader, non-artistic context and challenge the reality of the often quoted ‘transition to democracy’ of Myanmar post-2015. In essence, ‘Voices of Transition’ asks how we reconcile individual voices and national context, in order to understand societal ‘transition’.

Visitors to the exhibition will be exposed to a carefully curated set of media and practises. Moe Satt (b. 1983) presents his captivating video-art ‘Hands around in Yangon’ (2017), which deals poignantly with the daily tasks of many pairs of hands, revealing through its hypnotic pace the inner-workings of a day in the life of Yangon. Aye Ko (b.1963), winner of the Joseph Balestier Freedom of the Art’s Prize 2017, prints striking and tortured self-depictions, through which we are able to reflect on his time as a political prisoner. Nge Lay’s (b.1979) visceral and disarming photography explores the effects of time on the bodies of the female role models from her personal life, illustrating a central curatorial tenet of the exhibition, the departure of the old and the emergence of a new generation.

The exhibition will display major new works from the ‘father of Burmese modern art’, artist Aung Myint (b.1946), whose artworks have been collected by the Guggenheim. Until the 2000s, the colours red and gold were largely censored in art and film for political and religious reasons. Aung Myint’s use of colour and reinterpretation of traditional calligraphic and mural techniques are radical acts of rebellion. Acclaimed performance artists from Myanmar will be performing in person at the exhibition. Performance art, requiring minimal tools beyond the artist’s own body, has been a crucial medium of social-political participation, protest and solidarity in the struggle for a democratic Myanmar. While paintings can be symbolic, performance art is a direct action of defiance.

Lire la suite sur : https://www.lunnsgarbossa.com/current/

Le Vénérable W., portrait d’une figure birmane de la provocation : un troisième volet à la « Trilogie du mal » de Barbet Shroeder

Le Vénérable W., portrait d’une figure birmane de la provocation : un troisième volet à la « Trilogie du mal » de Barbet Shroeder par Bénédicte Brac de la Perrière, 26/09/2017, Carnets de Terrain

Provocante, l’image que l’on a vue cet été à l’affiche des cinémas parisiens l’est tout autant que celle à la une du Time Asie de juillet 2013 et dont la violence a suscité alors, en Birmanie,  le retrait à la vente du magazine. La première image montre un moine bouddhiste à la face d’ange méditant sur fond de mosquées calcinées. La seconde qui figure le même moine illustre un dossier intitulé « The Face of Buddhist Terror ». Les deux jouent sur le choc provoqué par l’association du bouddhisme à la terreur, renforcé par l’apparence angélique du religieux. Le public assez dispersé qui sort de la salle de cinéma parisienne en ce mois de juin caniculaire, sonné après ce document « glaçant », donne libre cours à sa consternation : « les bouddhistes aussi peuvent être haineux ! » peinant à comprendre qu’une partie de leur effarement tient à la force de l’illusion occidentale selon laquelle le bouddhisme ne serait pas une religion tout à fait comme les autres. Le documentaire de Barbet Shroeder éclaire crûment ce malentendu de la réception occidentale du bouddhisme comme philosophie pacifiste plutôt que comme religion inscrite dans des histoires particulières non dépourvues de violence. Ne ferait-il que cela, il servirait déjà notre discernement.

Mais s’il joue de ce malentendu, le cinéaste suisse poursuit un autre but, autopsier le « mal » dans ses ramifications, ses agissements et ses conséquences funestes à travers le portrait de Wirathu, moine appartenant à l’ordre bouddhiste de Birmanie qui s’est illustré depuis 2012 par ses discours islamophobes radicaux. Shroeder explique qu’essayant de se débarrasser d’un sentiment de rage qu’il éprouvait lui-même, en se réfugiant dans le bouddhisme, « sa dernière illusion », il avait découvert en Birmanie cet exemple bouddhiste de haine raciste et avait décidé d’en faire le troisième volet de sa « Trilogie du mal ». Inaugurée en 1974 avec son film Le Général Amin Dada. Autoportrait, poursuivie avec l’Avocat de la terreur qui date de 2007 et porte sur l’ambiguïté du personnage de Jacques Vergès, la trilogie est constituée d’une galerie de portraits dont la force tient à ce que son auteur « laisse la parole » à ses monstres, « il ne les juge pas, il les laisse dire des horreurs… qui les révèlent ». Shroeder a convaincu Wirathu de se laisser filmer en flattant ses tendances mégalomaniaques: il lui a seulement dit « que les Français qui allaient bientôt élire Marine Le Pen, étaient très intéressés par ce qu’il faisait de son côté en Birmanie ». Le fond d’islamophobie sur lequel surfe Wirathu en Birmanie n’est, on le sait, pas isolé et sa réactivation virulente résonne avec le discours planétaire rejetant la religion du prophète au nom de ses épigones radicalisés. Wirathu en utilisateur averti de tous les outils médiatiques et maître dans l’art de la provocation n’a pas hésité à répondre à la proposition du cinéaste.

Lire la suite sur : https://blogterrain.hypotheses.org/9816

Reflecting on the Saffron Revolution, In Poetry and Prose

Reflecting on the Saffron Revolution, in Poetry and Prose by Courtney Wittekind, 20/09/2017

This week’s posts on Tea Circle represent the start of our forum on the “Saffron Revolution,” during which we will feature submissions by those analyzing, debating, and reflecting upon the impact of Myanmar’s 2007 demonstrations, 10 years on. We will continue to accept submissions through the start of the forum, so if you would like to add your voice, whether in your own post or in the form of a response to another, please see our Call for Submissions or write to our editors at: editor@teacircleoxford.com.

We begin with a poem by celebrated Burmese journalist, activist, writer, and poet Khet Mar, “The Wound.” It was written in 2012 following the release of 651 political prisoners, many of whom were members of the 88 Generation Students’ Group and sentenced following their participation in the 2007 demonstrations. In it, Khet Mar reflects on the struggle for political change in Burma/Myanmar, the country’s resultant legacies of activism, and the experience of witnessing upheaval from afar— an experience all too common for those in exile.

Courtney Wittekind and Khet Mar connected earlier this week to discuss the poem’s representation of the Saffron Revolution’s leaders, its relation to political change writ large, and how its words relate to the present moment, as we now look back upon past events. Their conversation follows the poem in English and in Burmese.

Continuer la lecture de Reflecting on the Saffron Revolution, In Poetry and Prose

Rohingya identity and the limits to history

Rohingya identity and the limits to history by Jonathan Saha, 17/09/2017, New Mandala

Public discussions around Rohingya people currently fleeing violence in Rakhine state, Myanmar, have often involved arguments about history. While critical historical analysis is useful in offering insights into conflicts, History—if treated as a single, knowable past—is not. This is especially true when dealing with ethnicity. Whatever the past was, no amount of historical research can justify the current violence against Rohingya people.

The debate around Rohingya ethnicity lacks awareness of wider historiography (the history of historical research). On the one side, those denying that this is ethnic cleansing argue that there is no such thing as a Rohingya ethnic group. It is claimed that these people are actually Bengali Muslim migrants. The writings of historians such as Jacques Lieder have been used, by some, to support this position. He argues that the use of the term Rohingya to connote this Muslim population, although noted by eighteenth-century European travelers, is a modern one. For him, Rohingya is primarily a political identity. On the other side, Rohingya activists have resisted this characterisation. They have countered that there is evidence of Muslims living in the Rakhine region for centuries, and that these groups have periodically been called Rohingya.

Writing in The Diplomat last year, one commentator attempted to disentangle these debates by arguing that “the Rohingya are not an ethnic, but rather a political construction. [emphasis in original]”. This is wrong. Not only wrong in the sense of it being inaccurate, but wrong in two other ways: 1) in that it relies on a false division between the categories “political” and “ethnic”, and then treats the two as if they are mutually exclusive; and 2) in that it assumes that we can definitively know people’s ethnic identification in the past.

Lire la suite sur : http://www.newmandala.org/rohingya-limits-history/

Putting Myanmar’s “Buddhist Extremism” in an International Context

Putting Myanmar’s “Buddhist Extremism” in an International Context by Aye Thein, 01/09/2017, Tea Circle (Oxford)

Aye Thein argues that the international influences on “Buddhist extremism” have been overlooked.

This article further develops an idea I had briefly discussed in an earlier piece written for New Mandala in February 2017. A recent phenomenon in Myanmar, which has been called by different names by commentators depending on their preference, has put the country in the international spotlight. It has been characterised, among others terms, as “Buddhist nationalist”, “ultra-nationalist”, “militant Buddhist” and “Buddhist extremist”, the latter being used in the title of this article. MaBaTha or the Organisation for the Protection of Race and Religion, being the largest of the groups described by these various terms, has triggered a good deal of scholarly and journalistic attention.

What is problematic with the articles such as the ones using the terms quoted above is that most of them overemphasise the role of these groups as promoters of Islamophobia. In order to advance our understanding of this worrying trend, I will make the case here that more attention needs to be given to another role Buddhist nationalist groups play, which has hitherto been glossed over or commented on only in passing: that is, that they are in fact voracious consumers, albeit uncritical and selective, of global media coverage on Islam. This is where the international factor comes in.

Based on my reading of recent literature of the Buddhist nationalists in the Burmese language, I have observed at least three ways in which the international factor feeds into Islamophobia, as consumed and purveyed by these groups in Myanmar.

Lire la suite sur : https://teacircleoxford.com/2017/09/01/putting-myanmars-buddhist-extremism-in-an-international-context/

Political Communication and Transformative Citizenship in Myanmar (Part II)

Political Communication and Transformative Citizenship in Myanmar (Part II) by Matthew J. Walton, 07/09/2017, Tea Circle (Oxford)

One of the holy grails of democratic studies is the idea of transformative citizenship. Many have theorized about how democracy could be transformative or how engaged citizenship could transform relationships between citizens and government, but it is difficult to really track this concept.

A national political dialogue process made up of biannual 21st Century Panglong Conferences, themselves consisting of 700 elite representatives mostly drawn from a few centrally important institutions, reflects multiple views on citizenship, none of them transformative in empowering or ennobling ways. It further privileges direct political participation and decision-making for a select few, while imposing a set of passive citizenship practices on the vast majority of the population. A meaningful voice in political decision-making (particularly about their own affairs) is the central complaint of almost every interest group in Myanmar, from ethnic armed groups to women’s organisations to opposition parties and student unions. Yet almost every step of the process leading to the current national political dialogue framework (from initial negotiations between a small government team and ethnic armed group leaders through to the drafting of the final framework by a nine member, all male group behind closed doors) has reinforced the notion that for most, citizenship is primarily a non-participatory notion, merely the act of being represented. And this type of citizenship cannot be transformative in the sense of turning people into more active, knowledgeable, inter-connected, and empathetic members of a political community.

What types of citizen engagement might be potentially transformative? A 2011 study looked at the presumed benefits of citizen participation in democratic governance and found that the positive effects of expanded participation are noticeable primarily to those actually taking part, which should not be surprising. The study specified these benefits as coming in the form of “knowledge, skills, and [democratic] virtues” (Michels 2011, 290). This insight helps to distinguish between the effects of different types of “democratic innovations,” for example referendums and deliberative forums. While referendums seem to result in more direct policy influence, deliberative forums would contribute more to individual citizen development, not to mention the embeddedness that seems to be so critical in the citizen-political community relationship.

Lire la suite : https://teacircleoxford.com/2017/09/07/political-communication-and-transformative-citizenship-in-myanmar-part-ii/

Political Communication and Transformative Citizenship in Myanmar (Part I)

Political Communication and Transformative Citizenship in Myanmar (Part I) by Matthew J. Walton, 06/09/2017, Tea Circle (Oxford)

Citizenship is undoubtedly one of the more contentious issues in Myanmar today. But with so much focus on the boundaries of national inclusion, discussions usually ignore a key aspect of citizenship: its practice. The following two posts are excerpted from a chapter that will appear in an upcoming volume, Citizenship in Myanmar: ways of being in and from Burma, edited by Ashley South and Marie Lall (ISEAS Press and Chiang Mai University Press, 2018).

The practice of citizenship includes various perspectives on what citizenship entails (the different rights and responsibilities), the roles of state and civil society groups in fostering citizenship, and expectations of citizen participation (as well as expectations of the state in facilitating that participation). A discussion of the practice of citizenship should also include attention to the many “skills” of citizenship that go beyond basic rights and responsibilities. Especially important—but often unaddressed—are the particular citizenship skills that need to be cultivated by government officials.

Developing a broader understanding of a diverse range of citizenship skills and practices is particularly necessary in the context of Myanmar’s rapid political change. Since at least the 2008 constitutional referendum, the country’s citizens have been expected to participate in politics in a variety of ways that were not only previously unavailable to them, they were actively denied by military-led governments. The result is a situation in which the meaning and content of citizenship is either limited among citizens or expressed in ways that do not necessarily accord with centralized notions of citizenship and participation in Myanmar or with international norms.

In these two posts, I consider the practice of citizenship primarily in relation to the national political dialogue process, now officially reconfigured as the 21st Century Panglong Conference, arguably the forum that (in some form or another) will shape Myanmar’s political future. This is a useful starting point for critical analysis, especially because many of the crucial aspects of citizenship practice that I discuss are completely ignored in the current political dialogue process.

Lire la suite sur : https://teacircleoxford.com/2017/09/06/political-communication-and-transformative-citizenship-in-myanmar-part-i/

Myanmar’s Peace Process (Part III)

« Myanmar’s Peace Process: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, and other Post-Panglong Concerns » (Part III) by Bobby Anderson, 25/08/2017, Tea Circle (Oxford)

DDR processes are only one aspect of the state building process that will need to occur in EAO areas; durable peace will only arrive when communities in EAO areas discern value in citizenship, and so a distrusted state must deliver health, education, and other services, and offer impartial protections, including the provision of land tenure. Education is particularly important: successful reintegration and enhanced livelihood security in EAO areas are fundamentally a question of human resources, the foundation of which is public schools. Across Myanmar, the educational system is in need of repair, and this is doubly so in many EAO areas. Education is supposed to create citizens as well as workers literate in a common language. A lack of vocational and technical training centers, not only in areas accessible to EAO populations, but in Myanmar as a whole, is also an urgent issue. These matters warrant much greater exploration— exploration that is beyond the scope of this analysis, however.  Afghanistan amply demonstrates how both DDR and alternative livelihood programs fail when they are standalone programs occurring in areas lacking the administrative, service-oriented, and coercive presence of the state. 

The process of state building in insurgent areas will occur through an inflow of Bamar civil servants into these areas to deliver services, and this will also lead to resentment. As a rule of thumb, many EAO host populations will not possess the requisite human resource capacity to completely staff education, health, and general administrative posts. Business and capital, some of it exploitative, will follow. Migrants historically dominate local markets in newly colonized areas; Chinese already play this role in Kachin, while Naga markets in Northeast India are dominated by Marwaris and Biharis, and Han Chinese in Tibet. This can also cynically play into conflict resolution efforts, if it gives struggling ex-EAOs entities to levy extra legal taxes on.

Myanmar’s ethnic minorities—and for that matter, China’s Tibetans, Indonesia’s highland Papuans, Thailand’s hill tribes, and others—know that uncontrolled in-migration will reduce them to minorities, with their cultures and lands subsumed by newcomers. James C Scott’s engulfment— defined as the settlement of loyal (read: docile) populations with an existing “national” identity in areas where such identity was lacking among indigenous peoples— may occur as a part of an unstated but overarching government strategy to dilute the concentration of peoples with separatist tendencies in sensitive areas.

Lire la suite sur : https://teacircleoxford.com/2017/08/25/myanmars-peace-process-disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-borderland-economies-service-delivery-and-other-post-panglong-concerns-part-iii/